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Casenote

Custodial Collies of Transparency-The
Competitive Advantage of Protecting
Investing Lamm[bs] from Advising Wolves:
Lamm v. State Street Bank & Trust

I.

INTRODUCTION

Unscrupulous investment advisers who defraud their unsuspecting
clients are increasingly prevalent in our society.1 Consequently,
investors must be increasingly vigilant to protect themselves from such
individuals.2 A custodial bank is one way investors can prevent
mismanagement and misuse of funds and securities they entrust to
financial advisers. 3 However, the United States Court of Appeals for

1. See, e.g., Roger Wohlner, Beware of FinancialFraud,THE SMARTER INVESTOR (Apr.
24, 2013, 9:42 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-smarter-mutual-fundinvestor/2013/04/24/beware-of-financial-fraud.
2. See, e.g., id.
3. Dana Anspach, 4 Ways A Custodian ProtectsInvestment Fraud:Investment Fraud
And Rogue Advisers Can Be Avoided By Using A Custodian,ABOUT MONEY, http'//money
over55.about.com/od/avoidingfraud/a/investnenftfraud.htm (last visited Jan. 23,2015); see
17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2014); see also Wohlner, supra note 1.
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the Eleventh Circuit opinion Lamm v. State Street Bank & Trust4
illustrates that the mere presence of a custodial bank does not adequately insulate investors from fraudulent adviser activity.5 Under current
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations, specifically 17
Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) Section 275.206(4)-26 and boilerplate custody agreements,7 custodial banks have no duty to verify the
validity of account statement contents, which include transactions made
by clients' investment advisers and adviser-provided market valuations
of account assets.8 Therefore, there is a strong incentive for custodial
banks to distinguish their commoditized accounts by giving custodial
account holders the option to supplement the custodial services banks
traditionally supply with account services that facilitate increased
transparency.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2001, Douglas Lamm hired James Tagliaferri's firm, Taurus
Advisory Group, LLC (Taurus), as his investment adviser. In compliance
with SEC regulation 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2, which prohibits investment advisers from having direct custody of client's funds and securities,
Lamm opened two custodian accounts with separate qualified custodians.9 The two custody agreements"0 (collectively custody agreements)
Lamm executed for each account were identical in all relevant parts."
In 2007, State Street Bank & Trust Company (State Street), in
conjunction with its merger with Investors Bank & Trust Company,
assumed the obligations of both Mr. Lamm's custody
acquired and
12
agreements.

4. 749 F.3d 938 (11th Cir. 2014).
5. See id. at 951.

6. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2014).

7. As the third-largest custodial bank, State Street's custody agreements are common
in the industry. See Assets Under Custody, Worldwide, GLOBALCUSTODY.NET, http'/www
.globalcustody.net/us/custody-assetsworldwide/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).

8. See Lamm, 749 F.3d at 941.
9. Id.; see 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a). Lamm opened an individual account with Chase
Bank and an individual retirement account with Investment Bank & Trust Company.
Lamm, 749 F.3d at 941.
10. Custody Agreements, Lamm v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1321
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) (No. 12-CV-80317), ECF No. 1-3.

11. Lamm, 749 F.3d at 941 n.1; see Custody Agreements, supra note 10.
12. Lamm, 749 F.3d at 941. Concurrently, James Tagliaferri moved Taurus Advisory
Group, Tagliaferri's firm and Lamm's investment adviser, from Connecticut to the British
Virgin Islands and reorganized it as TAG Virgin Islands Inc.-a registered investment
adviser with the SEC that became, by merger, TAG Virgin Islands, LLC (collectively TAG).
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 12, Lamm v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 889
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Taurus Advisory Group, which became by merger TAG Virgin Islands

F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (No. 12-CV-80317), 2012 WL 1578242 (hereinafter
Complaint]; Tagliaferri, Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-15215, Exchange Act Release No.
68963, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3555, Investment Company Act Release No.
30402, 2013 SEC LEXIS 715, at *2 (Feb. 21, 2013) (Sec. & Exch. Comm'n). It was at this
time that Tagliaferri stopped investing his clients' funds and securities in conservative and
liquid investments, such as blue-chip stocks and municipal bonds, and began fraudulently
investing clients' assets in highly illiquid securities. These actions led to Lamm's suit
against State Street bank. Tagliaferri at *4, *6-7. Furthermore, Tagliaferri failed to
disclose material information to clients, including Lamm, about personal conflicts of
interest he had regarding investments Taurus made for them and about repaying the
clients of those conflicted investments with other clients' assets. Id. at *3. The latter
practice is, as the SEC's institution of proceedings against Lamm noted, an archetypical
'Ponzi-like scheme," id. at *1-2, and one that, as the Eleventh Circuit noted, has been
rampant in our society since the 1920's. See Lamm, 749 F.3d at 951 & n.10 (citing JORDAN
BELFORT, THE WOLF OF WALL STREET (2007) (the autobiography by Jordan Belfort, a
former stock broker who pled guilty to securities fraud in 1999); MITCHELL ZUCKOFF,
PONZI'S SCHEME: THE TRUE STORY OF A FINANCIAL LEGEND (2006) (a biography of Charles
Ponzi, the father of the financial scheme named after him)). Those conflicted investments
consisted of promissory notes issued by private companies controlled by or affiliated with
individuals who provided Tagliaferri with kickbacks and other compensation in exchange
for his purchase of those notes using client funds. Tagliaferri, at *2-3. When clients
demanded payment on these notes as they neared or reached their maturity date,
Tagliaferri paid the interest, principal, or both, by misusing assets of other clients. Id. at
*3. Tagliaferri accomplished this asset misuse by using his authority over advisory clients'
accounts to purchase thinly-traded corporate stocks from the same persons and entities
that gave Tagliaferri kickbacks for purchasing their notes. Id. at *2-3. Specifically, these
persons included Tagliaferri himself, his brother, an unnamed "Individual A," and
International Equine Acquisition Holdings, Inc. (International Equine). Id. The proceeds
made by the kickback-giving stock sellers were in turn used to make payments owed to
Tagliaferri's clients. Id. TAG's recognizable Ponzi scheme death spiraled until its collapse
between March 21, 2010, when it managed $261,000,000, and March 21,2012, when it friled
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Id. at *4-5. TAG's total assets under management plummeted
from $261 million to $9 million between March 25, 2010 and March 31, 2011, according to
its filings with the SEC. Id. at *4. Interestingly, International Equine, a primary issuer
of the fraudulently traded notes in which Lamin was invested and a provider of kickbacks,
was closely associated with Tagliaferri. Id. at *3. Big Brown, the thoroughbred race horse
that won the Kentucky Derby and Preakness Stakes in 2008-but, due its loss at the
Belmont Stakes, failed to complete the Triple Crown-was owned by International Equine.
Nate Raymond & Joseph Ax, U.S. Jury ConvictsAdviser over Fraud Tied to Microcaps, NY
Horse Firm, REUTERS (July 24, 2014, 7:23 PM), httpJwww.reuters.com/article/2014/07/24
/usa-crime-tagliaferri-idUSL2NOPS2WS20140724; see also Ryan Goldberg, How Big Brown's
People Nearly Pulled Off HorseRacing's Biggest Scam, DEADSPIN (June 7, 2013, 4:49 PM),
http://deadspin.com/how-big-browns-people-nearly-pulled-off-horse-racings-504679834
(claiming that Tagliaferri was the "decision-maker" of International Equine). Tagliaferri
was similarly involved with Fund.com, a thinly-traded stock of which he bought a
substantial amount of the stock involved in the Ponzi scheme, and UMS Partners Fund II,
L.P., a company from which Tagliaferri purchased non-existent promissory notes in the
same manner he did with Individual A. See Tagliaferri, supra, at *2-3.

1122

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

(collectively TAG), was named as Lamm's investment adviser under the
custody agreements and was authorized to furnish transaction instructions-including instruction to remit funds-to State Street on behalf of
and without any further approval from Lamm. Contractually, State
Street was obligated to send Lamm monthly statements of all transactions into or out of his account, with an itemization of all the funds or
securities in that account and, if provided to State Street, their current
market values. In the agreements, State Street disclaimed any
guarantee as to the accuracy of those market valuations."3 The waiver
provisions in the contracts stated that Lamm was deemed to have
ratified an account statement and State Street would be "released,
relieved and discharged," with respect to it unless Lamm objected in
writing within sixty days after the statement was issued. 4 Moreover,
the choice-of-law provisions designated the laws of the state of New York
to govern any disputes arising under the agreements. 5
The opening paragraphs of the custody agreements stated that the
accounts were "for the purpose of holding or disposing of any property"
State Street received from, or on behalf of, Lamm."6 When acting in
accordance with issued instructions, State Street was also authorized to
purchase and sell funds and securities in the custodial accounts as well
as to receive and deliver such assets without receipt.17 The agreements
further authorized State Street to accept, rely upon and effectuate all
the instructions, without any further confirmation from Lamm that it
believed, in good faith, were issued by Lamm or on his behalf."
Additionally, the custody agreements disclaimed all liability for any act
or omission attributable to State Street while acting in reliance on those
instructions, unless that reliance was the result of State Street's gross
negligence or willful misconduct. 9 However, a reservation-of-right
clause gave State Street the right to refuse to deposit into the account

13. Lamm v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1328 (2012), affd, 749
14(A), *8 1 19,
F.3d 938 (1lth Cir. 2014); Custody Agreements, supra note 10, at *6-7
*21-22 9114(A), *24 1 19.
14.

Custody Agreements, supra note 10, at *8

19, *24 1 19.

15. Id. at *10 9124(A), *26 1 24(A).
16. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1328 (quoting the two agreements); Custody Agreements,
supra note 10, at *16.
17. Custody Agreements, surpa note 10, at *2 2(a), (b), (g), *16 912(a), (b), (g).
18. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1328; Custody Agreements, supra note 10, at *5 9113,

*20 13.
19. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1328; Custody Agreements, supra note 10, at *5 1 13,
*9 1 20(B), *20 1 13, *24 1 20(B).
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any investment that it determined was not compatible, in form or
condition, with the services it provided.20
Tagliaferri, TAG's principal, used the investing discretion afforded to
TAG under Lamm's custody agreements to effectuate fraudulent
investments that resulted in Lamm losing $1,028,500.21 Specifically,
Tagliaferri invested Lamm's assets in highly speculative stocks and
purported promissory notes from micro-cap companies as well as in the
form of personal loans and mortgages.2 2 State Street accepted these

20. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1329; Custody Agreements, supra note 10, at *2 1 3, *17

13.
21. Complaint, supra note 12, at 47.
22. Lamm, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 941; Complaint, supranote 12, at 47. Tagliaferri's acts
have given rise to a substantial number of civil and criminal actions, as well as an SEC
proceeding, against him. Following a jury trial, Tagliaferri was convicted on twelve counts
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for his fraudulent
investments. Jury Verdict, U.S. v. Tagliaferri, No. 1:13-cr-00115-RA-1 (S.D.N.Y. July 24,
2014). The jury found Tagliaferri guilty of one count of investment adviser fraud, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b-6, -17 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012), one count of securities fraud, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b),
78ff (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012), four counts of wire fraud,
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012), and six counts of violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012).
Jury Verdict, supra. Since the jury was unable to reach a verdict on one count of wire
fraud and one count of violating the Travel Act, a mistrial was declared with respect to
those counts. Jury Verdict, supra;Indictment at 23-24, 26, 28, 30 Tagliaferri, No. 1:13-cr00115-RA-1, ECF No. 2, at 23-24, 26, 28, 30. Tagliaferri was released on bond with
restrictions limiting his travel to the Southern District of New York and the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut and imposing home detention and electronic
monitoring conditions. Order, U.S. v. Tagliaferri, No. 1:13-cr-00115-RA-1 (July 25, 2014),
ECF No. 56. The district court entered a money judgment of $2,500,000 against the
Tagliaferri and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 60 months imprisonment
(investment adviser fraud), 72 months imprisonment (wire fraud) and 60 months imprisonment (violation of the Travel Act). Order for Forfeiture of Property, U.S. v. Tagliaferri, No.
1:13-cr-00115-RA-1 (Feb. 19, 2015), EFC No. 136, at 2; Judgement, U.S. v. Tagliaferri, No.
1:13-cr-00115-RA-1 (Feb. 20, 2014), ECF No. 137, at 3. Tagliaferri appealed the district
court's judgment. Notice of Appeal -Final Judgment, U.S. v. Tagliaferri, No. 1:13-cr-00115RA-1 (Feb. 23, 2015), EFC No. 139.
The SEC has also instituted a proceeding against Tagliaferri for the frauds he committed
against his advisory clients. Tagliaferri supra note 12, at *1. The Administrative Law
Judge (AJ) stayed the proceeding pending adjudication of the criminal action against
Tagliaferri in the Southern District of New York. E.g., Tagliaferri, Admin. Proceeding File
No. 3-15215, Admin. Proceedings Rulings Release No. 2655, 2015 SEC LEXIS 822, at *1
(May 8, 2014).
On June 1, 2015, the AJ lifted the stay and ordered the SEC Division of Enforcement
to make its investigative file available to Tagliaferri. Tagliaferri, Admin. Proceeding File
No. 3-15215, Admin. Proceedings Rulings Release No. 2750, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2187, at *2
(June 1, 2015). Accordingly, the SEC proceeding against Tagliaferri has now begun to run
its course. See Tagliaferri, Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-15215, Admin. Proceedings
Rulings Release No. 2797, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2306, *1 (June 10, 2015) (Order Following
Prehearing Conference attended by Tagliaferri appearing pro se); see also Tagliaferri,
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purported notes on Lamm's behalf and listed them on the monthly
statements it issued to him even though the notes displayed facial
defects.2 3 In April 2011, State Street sent Lamm a letter stating that
since September 2010 it had notified him on each monthly account
statement that "illiquid, thinly traded and/or private placement
securities" in his account had become past due or were past their
Additionally, the letter also stated that
specified date of maturity.'
although TAG had previously provided the reported asset valuations,
and despite State Street's repeated efforts to obtain updated valuations,
the bank had not received valuation instructions since November 2010.
As a result, State Street declared that, on future statements, it would
not assign a value to those assets. Furthermore, on future statements
the value of these assets would be indicated as zero only as an indication
that a current valuation had not been received.2 ' Finally, the letter
reiterated that State Street did not provide independent valuations for
"illiquid, thinly traded and/or private placement securities."26
Consequently, Lamm filed suit against State Street in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Lamm's
seven-count complaint pleaded claims for breach of (1) express contract,
(2) implied contract, and (3) fiduciary duty, as well as (4) negligence, (5)

Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-15215, Admin. Proceedings Rulings Release No. 2800, 2015
SEC LEXIS 2329, *1 (June 11, 2015) (Protective Order "covering documents in the [SEC
Division of Enforcement's] investigative file that contain third parties' personally
identifiable or sensitive financial information").
Furthermore, other clients have instituted actions against State Street Bank, and some,
unlike Lamm, have also instituted actions against Tagliaferri and his associates for his
fraudulent transactions. See Szulik v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 935 F. Supp. 2d 240 (D.
Mass. 2014); Handal v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 941 F. Supp. 2d 167, (D. Mass. 2012);
In re State St. Cases, Civil Action Nos. 12-11770-NMG, 12-11796-NMG, 12-11814-NMG,
12-11984-NMG, 12-11988-NMG, 12-12089-NMG, 12-12090-NMG, 12-12287-NMG, 12-12376NMG, 2013 WL 5508349 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2013); see also Szulik v. Tagliaferri, 966 F.
Supp. 2d 339 (S.D.N.Y 2013). Lamm presumably did not seek action against Tagliaferri
because of State Street's obviously deeper pockets and the probability that, by the time a
judgment was rendered, Tagliaferri would be unable to repay any substantial portion of
Lamm's damages. Bill Singer, State Street Prevailsin Taurus Advisory Group Custodian
Account Fraud,Broke and Broker (Apr. 25, 2014), http'J/www.brokeandbroker.com/2388/
state-street-taurus/. In fact, TAG filed for bankruptcy the day after Lamm filed suit in the
district court. Compare Tagliaferri, supra note 12, with Complaint, supra note 12.
23. Lamm, 749 F.3d at 941 (discussing Complaint, supra note 12, at 30). Many of
these purported promissory notes accepted by State Street were signed by the investment
adviser-TAG or Tagliaferri acting through TAG-instead of the purported promisor(s), a
blatant facial defect. Complaint, supra note 12, at 29.
24. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1324-25; Complaint, supra note 12, at 48.
25. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1325; Complaint, supra note 12, at 1 48.
26. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1324-25; Complaint, supra note 12, at 1 48.
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gross negligence, and (6) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty
and (7) aiding and abetting fraud.2 7 Included in each count were
multiple allegations essentially claiming State Street beached its duties
owed to Lamm by failing to properly monitor and verify the transactions
made and valuations supplied by TAG.28 State Street moved to dismiss
Lamm's entire complaint, arguing that the custodial bank's role under
the custody agreements was strictly ministerial, and therefore Lamm
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.29

27. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1325. Lamm filed suit "individually and on behalf of the
Douglass Lamm IRA" (Lamm). Complaint, supra note 12. In total, Lamm alleged that
State Street breached its duties by:
(a) accepting the fraudulent promissory notes; (b) failing to notify Plaintiff that
certain purported promissory notes were signed by TAG rather than the purported
obligor; (c) failing to notify Plaintiff that certain purported promissory notes were
executed in favor of Hunter & Co. rather than Plaintiff; (d) disbursing funds to
purchase securities without timely receipt of stock certificates in exchange; (e)
disbursing funds to other, unknown accounts without receipt of any securities in
exchange; (f) reporting false [Committee on Uniform Security Identification
Procedures] CUSIP numbers on Plaintiffs monthly account statements; (g)
reporting inaccurate, inflated, or false market values for the assets held in
Plaintiffs accounts; (h) charging excessive custodial fees based on the inaccurate,
inflated, or false market values; i) failing to perform the auditing, reporting, and
custodial duties required of IRA custodians; and CQ)otherwise failing to notify
Plaintiff and the SEC of the "obvious fraud" committed by TAG.
Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
24-49.
28. Id.; Complaint, supra note 12, at
29. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1325. The district court analyzed State Streets motion
to dismiss, with respect to Lamm's fraud claims, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(FED. R. Civ. P.) 12(bX6) through FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a), FED. R. Cirv. P. 9(b), and other
applicable case law. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1325-26 (stating that FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b)
requirement is fulfilled when complaint states: "(1) precisely what statements were made
in what documents or oral representations or what omissions were made; (2) the time and
place of each statement and the person responsible for making (or in the case of omissions,
not making) same; (3) the content of such statements and the manner in which they misled
the plaintiff; and (4) what the defendants obtained as a consequence of the fraud"); see also
FED. R. CIrv. P. 12(b)(6) (2013) (motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted"); FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (2013) (requiring only "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"); FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)
(2013) (requiring that in all averments of 'fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake"); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'...
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged."); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding that a FED. R. Civ.
P. 12(bX6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed factual allegations; however, "a
plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
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The district court held that under Florida law the custody agreements'
choice-of-law provisions were enforceable.3 0 Accordingly, New York law
governed Lamm's contract claims. However, the court held that the
choice-of-law provisions did not embrace Lamm's tort claims.3
Applying Florida's "'most significant relationship' test," the court
determined that Florida law should be applied to Lamm's tort claims
because Florida bore a more significant relationship to those claims than
New York.32
The district court dismissed Lamm's breach of contract claim after
finding that, under New York law, State Street did not breach any of the
custody agreements' contractual duties." The court accepted State
Street's argument that none of the duties Lamm alleged State Street
breached were encompassed by the bank's actual duties under the
custody agreements.34 The court also agreed that the bank's custodial

will not do."); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (holding that the Court must
accept all of the plaintiffs pleaded allegations as true when addressing a motion to dismiss
under FED. R. CIv. P. 12(bX6)).
30. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1326; see Custody Agreement, supra note 10, at *10
24(A), *26 24(A). The court applied Florida law to determine the enforceability of the
custody agreements' choice-of-law provisions because "[f]ederal courts sitting in diversity
jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the forum state (Florida), including its choice
of law rules." Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1326.
31. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1326.
32. Id. at 1326-27. Under Florida's most significant relationship test,
courts consider the following factors in order to determine which state has the
most significant relationship to the incident giving rise to the tort: (a) the place
where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between
the parties centered.
Id. Since Lamm's assets were presumably located in Florida and he received his monthly
account statements in Florida, the court found Florida to have the most significant
relationship to Lamm's tort claims. Id. at 1327.
33. Id. at 1327, 1331. The court articulated applicable New York contract law and
applied it to Lamm's breach of contract claim. Id. at 1331. Under New York law, to state
a breach of contract claim a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a contract existed, (2) that the
party seeking recovery performed the contract, (3) that the other party did not perform,
and (4) damages by the party seeking recovery that are attributable to the breach. Id. at
1327.
34. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1329. State Street did not allege that the contact was
unenforceable. Id. at 1327. Under New York law, the district court reads contracts in light
of the parties' intent. Id. If the intent is clear from the contract, the provisions are to be
interpreted in a way that gives them their plain meaning and purpose without stripping
another provision of its effect. Id. Since the custody agreement clearly embodied the
intent of the parties, the district court limited State Street's contractual duties to those
expressly set forth in the custody agreement. Id. at 1331.
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role was "merely administrative," and held that State Street was only
contractually obligated to perform instructions provided to it by, or on
Above all, nothing in the agreements obligated
behalf of, Lamm.'
State Street to ensure timely delivery of assets into the account, nor did
it require State Street to verify the validity of investments it received.3"
In fact, the only discretion State Street contractually held was the
reserved right to reject investments deemed incompatible, in form or
condition, with the services the bank provided under the custody
agreements.3 7 The district court emphasized that Lamm's failure to
object within the waiver provisions' sixty-day window was also fatally
determinative to the breach of contract claim. 8 State Street's disclaimer of liability for claims arising from its reliance on issued instructions
further barred Lamm's claim for breach of contract. Moreover, because
the agreement did not require State Street to verify provided valuations,
it could calculate its fees based on the values provided. Lamm's
allegation that State Street charged excessive fees based on these
valuations, therefore, also failed.39
Since the custody agreements imposed no contractual duty on State
Street to discover fraudulent transactions, the obvious fraudulent nature
of the promissory notes in Lamm's account was insufficient to support
recognition of an independent duty. Accordingly, the district court held
that Lamm's "tort claims for negligence, gross negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty" were, in the absence of
an independent duty, barred by Florida's economic-loss rule.4" State
Street did not owe Lamm a fiduciary duty because, under Florida law,
banks do not typically owe customers such a duty.4' Moreover, in the
agreements, State Street disclaimed any fiduciary responsicustody
42
bility.

The district court also dismissed Lamm's aiding and abetting claims.
Lamm's claim failed because the facts he alleged were insufficient to
establish that State Street substantially assisted or encouraged the

35. Id. at 1329.
36. Id.
37. Id.; Custody Agreements, supra note 10, at *2 3, *17 [ 3.
38. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1330; see Custody Agreements, supra note 10, at *8 T!
19, *24 19.
39. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1329-31.
40. Id. at 1332. The economic-loss rule allows a recovery for tort damages arising out
of a contract only if the alleged tortious conduct constituted a tort independent of the
parties' contractual duties. Id. at 1331.
41. Id. at 1331.
42. Id. at 1332; Custody Agreements, supra note 10, at *9 20(A), *24 T 20(A).
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commission of any breach or fraud by Tagliaferri or that State Street
had actual knowledge of any breach of fiduciary duty or fraud.43
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

SEC Rule 206(4)-2: Policy & Relevant History
The Investment Advisers Act of 194044 (Advisers Act) was a Congressional effort, in light of the stock market crash of 1929, to prevent and
eradicate fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative practices by investment advisers.4 5 In 1960, Congress amended the Advisers Act to give
the SEC authority to promulgate rules and regulations that further the
purpose of the Advisers Act.4 6 Less than two years later, the SEC
47
adopted the custody rule under 17 C.F.R. 275.206(4)-2 (Rule 206(4)-2),
which instituted a mandatory system of segregation between client and
adviser assets designed to insulate client assets from an adviser's
"financial reverses, including insolvency. '
Under Rule 206(4)-2,
advisers who have custody or possession of client's funds or securities
are required to segregate the assets of each client in distinct trust
accounts that name the adviser as agent or trustee.49 In creating the
original rule and all subsequent revisions, the drafters never intended
or envisioned a system that placed any affirmative duties on qualified
custodians to monitor an investment adviser's transactions. °

43. Lamm, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1332-33.
44. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847,847-52 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21).
45. See Investment Advisors Act of 1940, ch. 686, §§ 201, 203, 205, 206, 54 Stat. 847,
850-852 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1, -3, -5, -6).
46. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, § 9, 74 Stat. 885,887 (1960) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-6(4).
47. 17 C.F.R. 275.206(4)-2 (2014).
48. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 123, 27 Fed. Reg. 2149, 2149 (Mar.
6, 1962) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 275.206(4)-2); see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO13-569, INVESTMENT ADVISERS: REQUIREMENTS AND COSTS AssocIATED WITH THE CUSTODY

RULE (July 2013), available at www.gao.gov/assets/660/655754pdf.
49. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 27 Fed. Reg. at 2149. The 1962 version of the
rule required advisers to: (1) send clients statements every three months itemizing all
funds and securities under custody or possession and (2) have an independent accountant
perform a surprise examination at least once a year to verify those assets. Id. at 2149-50.
The accountant was then required to file a certificate with the SEC affirming the
occurrence and specifying the nature and extent of that examination. Id. at 2150. Under
the contemporary version of the rule, only client assets that the adviser has custody of are
subject to the surprise examination requirement. 17 C.F.R. 275.206(4)-2(a04).
50. Lamm, 749 F.3d at 949 (stating that "the system [the drafters of SEC Rule 206(4)2] created, for better or for worse, was one of mere segregation between adviser and client
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B. Case Law Before the 2003 Rule 206(4)-2 Revision: Duties of
Custodians
Case law before the 2003 revisions held that absent a contract stating
otherwise, the only duty a broker owes to customers over whose account
the broker holds a non-discretionary role is to execute the accountholders instructions.5 1 Similarly, case law after the custody rule was
revised in 2003 supports this precedent by confirming that custodial
banks owe no duty to provide custodial account holders with transparency into funds and securities held in custodial accounts or transactions
made by clients' investment advisers.52
In 1971, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama held in Robinson v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.5 3 that the only duty a broker owed to a customer with a commodity

assets."); see Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 27 Fed. Reg. at 2149 (describing the custody
rule as requiring segregation of client funds and securities). In 1989, the SEC added 17
C.F.R. 275.279.8 (2014), which provided a cover page, Form ADV-E, for accountant
submissions of certificates of examination, and amended Rule 206(4)-2 to require such
certificates to be attached to completed ADV-E forms. 54 Fed. Reg. 32,048 (Aug. 4, 1989)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(aX5)). The revision also established a notice
provision-which the current rule retains-requiring advisers, after accepting custody or
possession of any client's funds or securities, to immediately notify such clients of the place
and manner in which those assets would be maintained, as well as any changes of such
place and manner. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 27 Fed. Reg. at 2150. In 1997, the
SEC amended the rule to apply only to investment advisers who, under 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3,
were registered or required to be registered with the SEC, explaining that the application
of the prophylactic provisions of the rule is a matter that was more appropriate for state
law. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3; Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1633, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,112, 28,127-28, 28,135
(May 22, 1997) (Sec. & Exch. Comm'n). 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 exempts investment advisers
that, among other things, are: (1) an adviser to any private fund that only has clients in
the state where the adviser's principal place of business or office is maintained and who
does not furnish advice; (2) an adviser to only insurance companies; (3) a foreign private
adviser; (4) a charitable organization, or an officer, trustee, director, employee, or volunteer
of such charitable organization, and complies with other enumerated stipulations; (5) a
church plan, or a person or entity eligible to establish such a plan, described in section
414(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 414(e) (2012); (6) registered as
commodity trading advisers with the Commodity Future Trading Commission and who do
not primarily act as investment advisers in the course of their business and comply with
other enumerated regulations; (7) non-entity investment advisers that have elected to be
regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-53 (2012), and who
solely advise certain categories of small business clients determined by the Small Business
Investment Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-657s (2012). 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3.
51. See infra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 76-99 and accompanying text.
53. 337 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Ala. 1971).
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account, under which the broker held a non-discretionary role, was to
execute the instructions issued on the customer's behalf with reasonable
care.5 4 Furthermore, the broker had no duty to advise the customer on
the reasonableness of those instructed transactions.55 The court also
held that because of the lack of discretionary or managerial authority
brokers have over client accounts, brokers' agency relationships begin
when customers issue instructions and end when those instructions are
effectuated. 6 Furthermore, no special relationship of trust and
confidence indicates that a fiduciary relationship exists between brokers
and their customers.5" Imposing such a duty would "destroy an
important part of the marketplace," namely the non-adversarial role that
custodial entities with no discretion play. Accordingly, the broker in
Robinson had no fiduciary or contractual duty to disclose any market
information known to it that was potentially or actually adverse to the
plaintiff's current investments.59
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, in the
1997 case of Kaiser v. FirstHawaiianBank,' held that a bank was not
liable for losses incurred by a life insurance company holding a custodial
account, over which the bank had no discretion, when another party had
complete discretion over the account under the insurance company's coinsurance agreement and used that discretion to misappropriate
funds.6 1 In granting the bank's motion for summary judgment on the
claims for, among others things, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary
duty, negligence, and gross negligence, the court held that the bank's
duties were limited to those provided for in the customer's custody
agreement.62 The bank was only obligated, under the agreement, to
follow instructions issued by a discretionary party; it explicitly disclaimed any obligation to verify the current valuations of assets

54. Id. at 108, 111.
55. Id. at 111.

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 113. The court also noted that other courts have held that broker-dealers,
in the absence of "an express investment advisory contract," similarly do not owe a
fiduciary duty to a customer unless that customer is "infirm or ignorant of business

affairs." Id. at 113; see also Leib v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 951, 952-53 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (compiling case law and articulating that the duties
of a broker to a customer who has a non-discretionary account with the broker cease when

a transaction order is effectuated).
59. Robinson, 337 F. Supp. at 112, 114.
60. 30 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (D. Haw. 1997).
61. Id. at 1257-58, 1268.
62. Id. at 1262-66, 1268.
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previously provided.6 3 Nevertheless, the court held that the bank owed
a minimal fiduciary duty to the account holder, but that duty was
limited to the duties imposed by the agreement." The court declined
to impose a fiduciary or tort duty on the bank because it would be
contradictory to the parties' arms-length agreement.65 Accordingly, the
bank had no duty under the custody agreement or otherwise to ensure
timely receipt of assets."
Similarly, in 2001 the grant of an Individual Retirement Account
(IRA) custodian's motion for summary judgment on the account-holders'
negligence claim was affirmed in Paszamant v. Retirement Accounts,
Inc. 7 by the Court of Appeals of Florida, Fifth District. 8 In Paszamant, the account holders executed custody agreements when they
opened their IRAs with the custodian. The agreements obligated the
IRA custodian to send funds on behalf of each account holder to a
mortgage investing company that would, in return, assign interest on
mortgages previously owned by the investing company to the IRA
custodian with each respective account holder as beneficiary. When the
IRA custodian entered bankruptcy, the account holders brought suit
against the custodian. The account holders conceded that the custodian
was not contractually liable, but claimed the custodian was negligent in
failing to verify that the investing company had actually invested the
funds sent by the custodian.69 The court rejected this argument and
refused to impose an independent duty on the custodian because the
custody agreements disclaimed any duty to provide the account holders
with advice on, or verification of account holders' investments. 7
Accordingly, the account holders, not the custodian, bore the duty to
detect discrepancies in all statements the custodian issued."'
C. The 2003 Rule 206(4)-2 Revision & Sekerak v. National City Bank
In 2003, the SEC substantially revised and reformatted Rule 206(4)-2
to parallel modern custodial practices, provide increased protection of
advisory clients' assets and clarify the circumstances in which an adviser

63. Id. at 1258-59, 1262, 1267.
64. Id. at 1265.
65. Id. at 1264, 1266. Additionally, the court declared that it would not create a

fiduciary duty that two sophisticated parties did not expressly provided for in their written
agreement. Id.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1266.
776 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1050-51.
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1053-54.
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would be deemed to have custody of client assets.72 Section (a) of the
revised rule, entitled "Safekeeping required," changed the segregation
language of the original rule to that of the modern "qualified custodian"
requirement.7 3 Further, this revision established that advisers cannot
have custody of client funds or securities, unless those assets are
maintained by a qualified custodian in either a distinct account for each
client held under that client's name or in accounts that contain only
client assets, which name the adviser as agent or trustee. 4
Under the 2003 revision and the current custody rule, an advisor who
holds-directly or indirectly-or has any authority to obtain possession
of client securities or funds, is deemed to have custody of such assets.7 5
Custody includes possession unless it occurs inadvertently and the assets

72. Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2176, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,692, 56,692 (Oct. 1, 2003) (Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n). The 2003 revision retained and revised many of the provisions from the previous
rule. See Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, supra, at
56,692 (as corrected at 68 Fed. Reg. 61,555 (Oct. 28, 2003)). It established "qualified
custodian" as meaning a bank, as defined under 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(aX2), or a savings
institution, as defined under 12 U.S.C. 1813(b)(1) (2012), that "has deposits insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" [F.D.I.C.]. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(dX6)(i);
Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, supra, at 56,693, 56,701.
A "qualified custodian" also includes financial institutions that clients and advisers, at the
time, typically went to for custodial services, specifically: broker-dealers, registered under
15 U.S.C. § 780(bX1) (2012), that hold the clients' assets in customer accounts; "futures
commission merchant registered under .. . 7 U.S.C. 6f(a)," that hold "client assets in
customer accounts, but only with respect to clients' funds and securities futures, or other
securities incidental to transactions in contracts for the purchase or sale of a commodity
for future delivery and options thereon;" and "foreign financial institution[s] that
customarily" hold financial assets for customers, but only if advisory clients' assets are held
in customer accounts that are "segregated from its proprietary assets." 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.206(4)-2(d)(6)(ii-iv). The "surprise examination" by an independent accountant
provision was also retained and revised, and provides that any material discrepancies
found must be reported, by the accountant, to the Commission within one business day.
See 17 C.F.R. 275.206(4)-2(a)(4); Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment
Advisers, supra, at 56,700 (as corrected at 68 Fed. Reg. 61,555).
73. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(1); Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by
Investment Advisers, supra note 72, at 56,700 (as corrected at 68 Fed. Reg. 61,555).
74. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a); Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment
Advisers, supra note 72, at 56,700 (as corrected at 68 Fed. Reg. 61,555). The custody rule
only applies to advisers who are registered or required to register with the SEC. 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.206(4)-2(a); Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, supra
note 72, at 56,700.
75. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(dX2); Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by
Investment Advisers, supra note 72, at 56,701 § (cXlXi)-(iii) (as corrected at 68 Fed. Reg.
61,555).
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are promptly returned within three business days of receipt.7" Furthermore, in any arrangement in which the adviser has authority or
permission to withdraw those client assets by providing instructions of
such to the custodian, the adviser is also deemed to have custody of
client assets.7 Custody, however, does not include the authority to
issue checks payable to third parties because such payables do not
constitute "client funds" within the meaning of the rule.7 8 The drafters
of the rule believed that the rule, and the situations described above,
made it clear that an adviser is deemed to have custody when client
funds or securities can be controlled by the adviser for purposes other
than authorized trading.7 9 Furthermore, the drafters concluded that
authority to issue instructions to a custodian to effect or to settle trades
of funds or securities did not constitute "custody."
The 2003 revision explicitly named and revised the "Notice to clients"
provision and made it applicable to situations in which advisers open
accounts with qualified custodians on the client's behalf, either under
the client's name or, as an agent, the adviser's name."1 Under the
revision, account statements must be sent to the client by the qualified
custodian. 2 This requirement was "designed to assure the integrity"
76. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(dX2)(i); Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by
Investment Advisers, supra note 72, at 56,701 (as corrected at 68 Fed. Reg. 61,555).
77. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(dX2)(ii); Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by
Investment Advisers, supra note 72, at 56,701 (as corrected at 68 Fed. Reg. 61555).
Furthermore, having custody of client funds or securities also includes any "capacity" that
the adviser or the adviser's supervised person has access to or legal ownership of those
client assets. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(d)(2Xiii); Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients
by Investment Advisers, supra note 72, at 56,701 (as corrected at 68 Fed. Reg. 61,555).
78. Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, supra note 72,
at 55,693, 56,701 (as corrected at 68 Fed. Reg. 61,555).
79. Id. at 55,692-93.
80. Id. (as corrected at 68 Fed. Reg. 61,555). This conclusion was due to the fact that
custodians generally are under "delivery versus payment" arrangements where assets are
only transferred out of a client's account upon receipt of the corresponding transfer into the
account. Id. The drafters declined to adopt an exception to the custody definition for
advisers who were authorized to access client funds purely to deduct their incurred fees.
Id.
81. Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, supra note 72,
at 56,700 (as corrected at 68 Fed. Reg. 61,555); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(2). This version
of the notice provision is retained in the current rule. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(2).
82. Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, supra note 72,
56,700 (as corrected at 68 Fed. Reg. 61555); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(2). The adviser
must have a reasonable belief that the qualified custodian sends at least the required
quarterly account statements itemizing all funds and securities in the account and related
transactions directly to the client. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(aX3); Custody of Funds or
Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, supra note 72, at 56,700 (as corrected at 68
Fed. Reg. 61,555).
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of such account statements and allow clients to identify any erroneous
or fraudulent activity by their adviser.8 Therefore, the rule presupposed diligence and prudence by advisory clients because the purpose of
requiring custodians to issue account statements is to ensure that clients
have adequate information to review and monitor their investments.'
In Sekerak v. National City Bank,85 a 2004 case factually similar to
Lamm heard in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, Jean Sekerak entered into a custody agreement with a
qualified custodian.8 6 That agreement gave the company adviser,
Thomas Durkin, total investing discretion over funds and securities in
Sekerak's account, which Durkin used to defraud Sekerak. Subsequently, Sekerak sued the custodial bank, and the court granted the bank's
motion for summary judgment on Sekerak's claims for breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and aiding and abetting
fraud. 7 Citing Kaiser, the court held that the custody agreement,
which relieved the bank of any duty to verify the transactions made by
the investment adviser, was enforceable and dispositive." The court
further found that Sekerak waived any objection to Durkin's discretionary transactions by failing to timely object to the account statements the
qualified custodian issued to her." The court also held that, like a
broker who owes no fiduciary duty to non-discretionary account holders,
the custodial bank owed Sekerak no fiduciary duty.90 Furthermore,
since Sekerak's damages were economic and governed by the custody
agreement, the economic-loss rule barred her negligence claim.91
83. Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, supra note 72,
at 56,694 (as corrected at 68 Fed. Reg. 61,555).
84. See id. A client may, under the rule post-the 2003 amendment, specify an
independent representative to receive notices and account statements on his behalf. Id.
at 56,700-01 (as corrected at 68 Fed. Reg. 61,555); see 17 C.F.R. 275.206(4)-2(aX7). An
independent representative is a person that acts as an agent and is contractually obligated
to act in the best interest of the advisory client, does not control or is not controlled by the
adviser, and does not or has not had a material business relationship with the adviser. 17
C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(dX4).
85. 342 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
86. Id. at 703.
87. Id. at 707, 711, 712, 715-17.
88. Id. at 707.
89. Id. at 708.
90. Id. at 712.
91. Id. at 715. The economic-loss rule, which bars tort claims if the only damages
suffered are purely economic contractual losses, may also pose an additional barrier to such
tort law claims against custodial banks. See Tiara Condo. Ass'n v. Marsh & McLennan
Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 400 (Fla. 2013) (restricting Florida's economic-loss rule to products
liability claims); see also City of Atlanta v. Benator, 310 Ga. App. 597, 605, 714 S.E.2d 109,
116 (2011) (citing Georgia cases applying Georgia's economic loss rule, O.C.GA. § 51-1-

20151

LAMM V. STATE STREET BANK & TRUST

1135

Aiding and abetting requires that the party asserting the claim prove
the conduct that gave rise to the underlying claim was known by the
defendant and the defendant substantially assisted or encouraged the
commission of that act. 2 The court further held that no material fact
in the record supported that the bank had knowledge or was even aware
of Durkin's fraudulent activity.s3 Therefore, Sekerak's aiding and
abetting fraud claim did not satisfy the claim's knowledge element.94
Additionally, other courts have held that allegations that the suggested
aider and abettor should have known of the commission are insufficient
to establish the knowledge required to sustain a claim for aiding and
abetting either fraud or a breach of fiduciary duty.95

11(a) (2010 & Supp. 2014), to contexts other than products liability claims); Pub. Bldg.
Auth. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 80 So. 3d 171, 184 (Ala. 2010) (extending
Alabama's economic-loss rule from products liability cases to a commercial construction
case). However, the Supreme Court of Florida recently limited the economic-loss rule's
application to products liability claims. Tiara, 110 So. 3d. at 407. Recovery may still be
possible if the breach of contract also constitutes an independent tort, such as negligence.
See Lamm, 749 F.3d at 947 (quoting Rushing v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 752 F. Supp. 2d
1254, 1263 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (holding that tort claims against a bank were not barred
where, under the account agreement, the bank "could be held liable for losses caused by
[its] own negligence.")).
92. See, e.g., Sekerak, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 716-17. Aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting fraud both require knowledge on the part of the
defendant of the underlying fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Plantinum Estates,
Inc. v. TD Bank, No. 11-60670-CIV-Marra/Johnson 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30684, at *9
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2012) (holding that, under Florida law, the plaintiff must prove the
defendant had actual knowledge of the underlying fraud to sustain a claim for aiding and
abetting fraud); see also Court Appointed Receiver of Lancer Off shore, Inc. v. Citco Grp.
Ltd., No. 05-60080-CIV-Marra/Johnson 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25740, at *16 (S.D. Fla. Mar.
31, 2008) (holding that, under Florida law, the plaintiff must prove the defendant had
actual knowledge of the underlying breach of fiduciary duty to sustain a claim for aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty). However, as the district court and the Eleventh
Circuit noted, the validity of aiding and abetting fraud as a cause of action is unclear under
Florida law. Lamm, 749 F.3d at 950 n.9. In Georgia, aiding and abetting fraud and aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty are recognized claims. See Cohen v. Morgan Schiff
& Co. (In re Friedman's Inc.), 385 B.R. 381, 430-31 (S.D. Ga. 2008) (applying the tort of
aiding and abetting fraud). In Alabama, it is also unclear whether aiding and abetting
fraud is a recognized cause of action. See Tucker v. Ernst & Young, LLP, No.1121048,2014
Ala. LEXIS 87, at "1, n.1 (Ala. June 13, 2014) (stating that the plaintiffs complaint
contained an aiding and abetting fraud claim, but giving it no further analysis).
93. Sekerak, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
94. Id. Because the claim failed the knowledge requirement, the court found it
unnecessary to analyze the second element of a claim for aiding and abetting fraud:
requiring substantial assistance or encouragement of the primary tortfeasor. Id.
95. See Platinum Estates, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30684, at *10 (holding that
allegations of knowledge are not sufficient to sustain a claim of aiding and abetting fraud
"where the facts in the complaint only suggest[ that the defendant should have known"
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Case law before and after the 2003 revision to the custody rule and
the revision itself emphasize an adherence to the following the express
duties of the account agreements; the implicit obligation of account
holders to use reasonable care in examining their account statements;
and that failing to object to discrepancies within a reasonable time
constitutes acquiescence." Accordingly, custodial banks are not liable
for investor losses caused by clients' investment advisers.
IV.

CouRT's RATIONALE

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's entire complaint in Lamm
v. State Street Bank & Trust9 The court focused on the lack of any
authority imposing a duty on a financial custodian with no discretion to
guarantee the legitimacy, reasonableness, reported valuations, or any
duty-notwithstanding the duty to execute instructions issued by
discretionary parties.9"
State Street's Duties Under the Custody Agreements
Using the same analogy as the court in Sekerak, the Eleventh Circuit
compared State Street, a bank with no investment discretion, to a broker
whose only duty is to execute orders when issued on behalf of the
account holder.9 Accordingly, the court held that State Street did not

A.

(quoting Groom v. Bank of Am., No. 8:08-CV-2567-JDW-EAJ, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2374,
at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9,201))); Rosner v. Bank of China, No. 06-CV-135621 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 105984, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18,2008) (holding that allegations that the defendant
should have known are insufficient to sustain a claim for aiding and abetting fraud); cf
Court Appointed Receiver of Lancer Offshore, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25740, at *49
(holding that allegations that the defendant should have known, based on "red flags" such
as "atypical activities" are insufficient to sustain a claim for aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty).
96. See supra notes 54-95 and accompanying text.
97. 749 F.3d 938 (11th Cir. 2014).
98. See infra notes 99-114 and accompanying text. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the
district court's grant of State Street's motion to dismiss de novo and construed all of
Lamm's factual allegations as true and in a light most favorable to his claims. Lamm, 749
F.3d at 942-43. The court also noted that to survive the defendant's motion to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), his "'[Iflactual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Id. at 943 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555).
99. Lamm, 749 F.3d at 943 (quoting Sekerak, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 712); Martinez Tapia
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA., 149 F.3d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1998); see also J.C. Bradford
Futures, Inc. v. Dahlonega Mint, Inc., No. 89-5581 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 11787, at *20
(6th Cir. July 11, 1990); Hill v. Bach Halsey Stuart Shields Inc., 790 F.2d 817, 824-25 (10th
Cir. 1986).

20151

LAMM V. STATE STREET BANK & TRUST

1137

breach its contracts with Lamm by distributing funds for the purchase
The court emphasized that, under the custody
of fake notes.' °
agreements, State Street was authorized to act in accordance with issued
instructions without inquiring into the circumstances and to rely on any
instructions the bank believed were issued in good faith.'0 1 Since
Lamm failed to sufficiently allege that State Street knew the instructions were not issued in good faith, the court held that State Street did
by listing false or inflated valuations on
not breach the agreements
10 2
Lamm's statements.

The court further noted that the custody agreements' waiver provisions and Lamm's failure to timely object meant he was deemed to have
approved the reported market values-a further bar on Lamm's breach
of contract claim. 10 3 Citing Kaiser, the court held that the custody
agreements authorized State Street to remit funds based on authorized
instructions to any payee without receipt of any asset." In regard to
Lamm's claim that State Street charged excessive fees, the court held
that the agreement only obligated State Street to charge fees based on
provided market values, and that in doing so, State Street did not
breach the agreement because under the custody agreements' waiver
provisions, Lamm ratified those reported valuations. 10 5
State Street's Duties Independent of the Custody Agreements
The Eleventh Circuit noted that because the Supreme Court of Florida
in 7iara Condo. Ass'n v. Marsh & MeLennan Co.' limited the application of Florida's economic loss rule to products liability cases, the rule no
longer barred Lamm's tort claims against State Street. °7 However,
Lamm still had to prove that State Street's tortious conduct constituted
an independent tort outside any breach of contract.10 8 The court
compared Lamm to Paszamant and held that Lamm failed to establish
that State Street owed him any independent duty to supervise his

B.

100. Lamm, 749 F.3d at 945.
101. Id. at 944.

102. Id. at 945.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 944 (citing Kaiser, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1266 (holding that a custodial bank was
not liable under the custody agreement that did "not expressly provide that the acquisition
of securities must occur simultaneously with the release of funds form the Custodial
Account")).

105. Id. at 946.
106. 110 So. 3d 399 (Fla. 2013).
107. Lamm, 749 F.3d at 947.

108. Id.
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account. 10 9 In support of this holding, the court stated that the policy
underlying Rule 206(4)-2 did not support imposing such an independent
duty.110
The court also held that the facial defects on the funds and securities
State Street accepted were insufficient to establish the knowledge
required to prove a claim for aiding and abetting fraud or breach of
fiduciary duty.'
Because the arm's length custody agreements did
not establish a relationship of trust and confidence required to impose
minimal fiduciary duties, the court held that Lamm failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. 112 Furthermore, Lamm
failed to plead facts sufficiently demonstrating that State Street induced
him to rely on any representation as to the validity of the accounts'
funds or securities."' For
this reason, Lamm's negligent misrepresen114
tation claim also failed.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

While Lamm v. State Street Bank & Trust Co. was decided correctly
under the facts of the case and its controlling custody agreements, it
illustrates a need for increased transparency of the transactions
executed by investment advisers not subject to the surprise examination
requirement under Rule 206(4)-2. The investing community as a whole
may not be aware of this need; however, it is necessary to avoid similar
occurrences. This transition can occur as a top-down change to current
banking practices, through new or amended regulations, or as a bottomup integration, through consumer demand or creation of transparency
services by custodial banks.
Since the system focuses on segregation of client funds and securities
by custodial banks and not the transparency of adviser discretionary
transactions, Rule 206(4)-2 presupposes and relies on clients diligently
reviewing account statements that their qualified custodians issue. With
an absence of such diligence by advisory clients, the system that the

109. Id. at 948, 950.
110. Id. at 948; see supra note 50 and accompanying text. Additionally, Florida's
version of U.C.C. § 4-103, FLA. STAT. § 674.103(1) (1993 & Supp. 2015), which prohibits

banks from disclaiming liability for a failure to exercise ordinary care, did not impose an
independent duty because U.C.C. Article 4 only applies to deposits and collections, not
custodial banks. Lamm, 749 F.3d at 949-50; U.C.C. § 4-202 (2002). Even if this duty did
apply, Lamm presented no allegation that State Street effectuated unauthorized
transactions. Lamm, 749 F.3d at 950.
111. Lamm, 749 F.3d at 950-51.
112. Id. at 951.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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drafters of Rule 206(4)-2(a)(4) created cannot function properly.
Furthermore, advisers that do not have custody of client funds or
securities are, implicitly under subsection (a)(4), not subject to the
custody rule's surprise examination by the independent accountant
requirement. Customarily, custodian banks do not contractually provide
for and, in fact, explicitly disclaim, all duties to ensure the legitimacy of
adviser transactions or verify the adviser-provided valuations of funds
and securities in custodial accounts. When advisory clients habitually
neglect to review their account statements and their custodial banks
provide no transparency into their advisers' transactions, the circumstances are ripe for unscrupulous advisers, such as Tagliaferri, to
defraud their clients.
Lamm's lack of diligence is more responsible for his lost principal than
The losses Lamm sustained could have been mitigated
State Street.
by diligent review of the monthly account statements State Street
issued. His own neglect and delay is to blame for his loss, not State
Street. Had he reviewed his account statements in a timely manner, he
would have at least noticed monthly notifications that State Street was
unable to obtain updated valuations. Nevertheless, a change is necessary
to prevent future less-negligent victims from experiencing similar losses.
While the drafters of Rule 206(4)-2 did not intend, and the policy
underling the rule does not support, a duty on the part of custodial
banks to protect their customers from unethical investment advisers,
this case, and many like it, demonstrates that the rule may need to be
revised to continue to effectuate its purpose of providing a system
facilitating transparency into the activities of investment advisers. The
SEC could reform the original system of segregation to create one that
imposes an active role on custodians by requiring them to ensure the
validity of transaction instructions and provide independent valuations
of funds and securities.
Unfortunately, a top-down reform is unlikely because the drafters of
Rule 206(4)-2 did not envision a rule requiring custodial banks to have
an active role beyond merely holding client assets and issuing account
statements. 1 5 Decreased regulations facilitate the market to function
effectively. Furthermore, increased regulations ultimately increase the
cost of financial services to the consumer because of the increased cost
compliance that providers of financial services incur in rendering
services.' s Additionally, any top-down regulation will inevitably leave
Regulations also maintain incentives for unscrupulous
loopholes.

115. Id. at 949; see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
116. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 48 (stating the GAO is

statutorily mandated to study and report the cost of compliance for investment advisers).
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advisers to find loopholes. Further, additional regulations will create
more loopholes because of the inability to foresee all possibilities.
Specifically, Tagliaferri is an example of the adage, 'here there is a
will there is a way." In this case, not much "will" was needed to find a
"way" because TAG qualified for an exemption to the surprise audit
requirement of Rule 206(4)-2 and claimed on its filings with the IRS that
it did not have custody of client funds.' 7 Drafting and implementing
regulations also costs both the SEC and those required to comply
additional time and money. Furthermore, the only incentive regulations
give qualified custodians is ensured compliance. Above all, such a system
would increase the cost of compliance for custodial banks, which would
then increase the costs passed on to the custodial account holder.'18

117. See Taurus Advisory Group LLC, Uniform Application for Investment Advisor
Registration, Form ADV, Part IA, Item 9(A)-(C) (Feb. 2005) (Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) (ADV
form for Taurus, signed by Tagliaferri as president, stating that the company had no
custody of advisory client funds or securities); see also TAG Virgin Islands, Uniform
Application for Investment Advisor Registration, Form ADV, Part 1A,Item 9(A)-(D) (Nov.
2010) (Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) (ADV form, signed by Tagliaferri as president, for Tag Virgin
Islands stating that the company did not have custody of advisory clients' funds or
securities with no annual surprise examination report attached; see also TAG Virgin
Islands, Inc., Firm Disclosure Brochure, at Portfolio Administration: Custody, Form ADV,
Part 2 (Mar. 31, 2011) (Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) (Stating that "[cilients [of TAG Virgin
Islands, Inc.] are responsible for selecting an independent bank or broker/dealer as
custodian for their assets. TAG Virgin Islands, Inc. does not have physical control of
clients' assets, money or securities. To the extent the firm may withdraw advisory fees
directly from client accounts, it may be considered to have custody in a limited capacity.
Custody due solely to the direct withdrawal of fees does not entail all of the same legal and
regulatory requirements as an investment adviser with physical custody of clients' assets.
Accordingly, clients only receive account statements from their bank or broker/dealer
custodian").
118. In fact, in 2009, after the events that gave rise to Lamm's suit against State
Street, and in light of recent frauds by investment advisers, including Bernard Madoff, the
SEC amended a substantial number of rules to combat such fraud. See also Custody of
Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, Investment Adviser Act Release No.
2876, 74 Fed. Reg. 25,354, 25,355 (May 27, 2009) (Sec. & Exch Comm'n); U.S. Govr
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 48; See Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by
Investment Advisers, Investment Adviser Act Release No. 2968, 75 Fed. Reg. 1456
(January 11, 2010) (Sec. & Exch. Comm'n). The revision, among other things, expanded
the scope of the surprise examination requirement, but only with respect to advisers who
retained custody of client funds or securities. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(aX4); see also U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra 48; see Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by
Investment Advisers, supra at 1484. The revision required independent accountants to
notify the Commission of any resignation, dismissal, removal, or termination of its
engagement to perform the surprise examination along with "[a]n explanation of any
problems relating to [the] examination scope or procedure that contributed to such resignation, dismissal, removal, or other termination." 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(4)(ii)-(iii);
Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, supra at 1484. This
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Even after almost a decade of highly publicized fraudulent investment
advisers, consumers have not collectively demanded changes to custodial
In part, this request is missing because most
banking practices.
who
have entrusted substantial portions of money to
clients
advisory
investment advisers are prudent enough to check their account
statements regularly, as the system presupposes they will. Under Rule
206(4)-2, advisory clients can appoint an independent representative to
receive all notices and account statements required under the rule on
their behalf.11 9 Clients could use this avenue to provide transparency
without insisting on a change to current custodial banking practices.
Unfortunately, it is evident that many advisory clients that should elect
to implement this regulatory option do not do so.
Less prudent advisory clients, like Lamm, who would benefit from the
protection of a system that provides more than mere segregation, are
unlikely to demand reformation. When this is compounded with the
improbability of a change from the SEC, qualified custodial banks are
therefore the only other logical source for improved transparency. If
custodial banks provide for systems that ensure transparency and verify
investment adviser transactions, they can gain a competitive advantage
over other entities offering commoditized custodial accounts. Banks will
have to educate consumers that may not currently be aware of the need
for such provisions. However, there is an incentive for banks to do so
because it will result in an increased demand for these new account
offerings. Consumer education will also result in an investing communiof
ty that is more knowledgeable and protected. Many critiques 12
economic analysis of financial services say the market is unique.
This is true, but the average reasonable consumers in the industry are

revision defined "independent public accountant." 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(d)(3); Custody
of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, supra at 1485. The previously
rejected fee deduction exception was also added to this revision. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)2(bX3); Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, supra at 1485.
A definition of control was added, improving the rule's clarity. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)2(d)(1); Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, supra at 1485.
The new rule also required that the adviser's reasonable belief that the qualified custodian
is sending the required account statements must be formed "after 'due inquiry.'" See
Custody of Funds or Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, supra 1457-58, 1482-83.
Above all, the rule still allows the exception to the independent audit requirement for
advisers who are not deemed to have custody of client funds. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(aX4).
Consequently, the original system of segregation is still in effect. See Custody of Funds or
Securities of Clients by Investment Advisers, supra at 1457-58, 1483.
119. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(aX7), -2(d)(4)(i)-(iii).
120. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of FinancialRegulation: Case
Studies and Implications4 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 234,
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papaers.cfm?abstractid=2375396.
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much more knowledgeable than the average consumer of other goods and
services. Furthermore, custodial banks can preempt regulations that
could imposes even more expansive duties than contractual reform.
Through accounting services that ensure the validity of transactions
and valuations without providing advice on the wisdom of those
transactions, custodial banks can remain in their current non-discretionary segregation role that insulates them from liability for advisory client
losses while providing custodial clients with a mutually-beneficial
account service. This strategy, however, would result in increased cost
to the end consumer. Therefore, banks will not desire to offer such
provisions universally across all custodial account offerings. Nevertheless, for those niche custodial clients, like Lamm, who would feel and be
more protected by such services, this change can be a source of increased
revenue from custodial accounts." 1 Under a system where custodial
banks control the customary transparency mechanisms, the industry can
quickly adapt the current practices to respond to any previously
unforeseen loopholes. By contractually adding more duties than
required by regulation, banks are forcing their competitors to stop hiding
behind regulations and compete with this emerging opportunity to gain
a competitive advantage in a commoditized market. Consequently, State
Street, as the world's third-largest custodial bank, or one of its
competitors, could gain a significant competitive advantage and increase
the revenue generated by custodial accounts.12 2
STEVEN L. JONES

121. Under the custody agreements, State Street charged five basis points (.0005
percent) annually, which was to be paid in advance every quarter. Custody Agreements,
supra note 10, at 8 16, 23 16. State Street charged no transaction fee and an annual
minimum fee of $800 and $400 for related accounts. Id.
122. See Assets under Custody, Worldwide, supra note 7.

